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Professors Asimow and Klein have recently described and ana-
lyzed the accounting procedures used in several negative income
tax (NIT) experiments funded by the Office of Economic Op-
portunity.' They propose that these techniques be adopted in
a nationwide welfare program. 2 This comment will raise a num-
ber of questions about the assumptions underlying their proposed
solution.
At the heart of the suggested accounting procedures is a decision
to use a family's past income to determine current welfare pay-
ments.3 The period chosen is the income for the "prior month."4
However, two techniques are used to minimize the effect of fluctu-
ating income on the amount of benefits. First, the income of the
"prior month" is derived by averaging the income of the prior
three months.5 High income in January can, therefore, prevent
welfare payments in April because the income in March is based
on the average of income for January, February, and March.
Similarly, high income in March might not prevent April welfare
payments since the income for March will be averaged with Jan-
uary and February earnings. Thus, this technique reduces the
difference between welfare recipients with steady income and
those with either rising or falling income.
Second, a carry forward of income is provided for twelve months
whenever monthly income exceeds the amount of earnings at
which welfare ceases.6 If monthly income of $500 is the point at
*Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. A.B., 1958, LL.B.
1961, Harvard University.
1 Asimow & Klein, The Negative Income Tax: Accounting Problems and a
Proposed Solution, 8 HARv. J. LEGis. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Solution].
2 Id. 3-4, 31.
3 Id. 4-6.
4 Id. 21 (Rule 2).
5 Id. 21 (Rule 4).
6 See id. 21 (Rule 7), 24 (Rule 9), 26 (Rule 10).
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which welfare ceases, for example, monthly income of $600 in
January, February, and March would reduce possible welfare pay-
ments for eleven months after March because the $300 excess is
carried forward. A carry back provision is not proposed. Thus,
the carryover reduces the difference between welfare claimants
with steady income and those with declining income, but not
between those with steady income and those with rising income.
Welfare recipients are required to report income monthly,7
or every four weeks if more convenient.8 Businessmen, on the
other hand, are allowed to report net income annually rather than
monthly. In this case the income of the prior year is presumed
to have been available in twelve equal installments over the twelve
months beginning with the month in which the calculation is
made.9
There are a number of difficulties with these accounting pro.
cedures which relate primarily to the treatment of declining
income, the retrospective determination of income, and monthly
reporting. After discussing these procedures I will comment briefly
on a few of the problems posed by an alternative proposal, sug-
gested in an earlier article,10 which utilizes a system of withhold-
ing from wages.
I. TREATMENT OF DECLINING INCOME
The decision to carry forward income rests on the assumption
that it would be unfair to differentiate between welfare recipients
with declining income and those with steady income." This as-
sumption seems questionable. A great many poor people are likely
to have declining income.' 2 The decline could have serious con-
7 Id. 21 (Rule 3).
8 Id. 9, n.11, 21, (Rule 2, comment).
9 Id. 21 (Rule 5), 21-22 (comment), 22-23, (Rule 6), 23, (comment).
10 Popkin, Administration of a Negative Income Tax, 78 YArE L.J. 388 (1969).
11 Cf. Proposed Solution 10-11.
12 I do not know how many. The image of the unemployed urban worker
whose income declines because he is thrown out of a job is probably a distortion
of the national picture. The majority of the poor are probably rural southerners
with stable low income, rather than urban workers beset by an uncertain labor
market. See generally S. MIL.aE & F. RESMAN, SOCIAL CLASS & SOCIAL POLICY 38-42
(1968). Nonetheless, the rural southerner will appear to have fluctuating income
under the Proposed Solution if he is a farmer, because cash accounting is used and
high receipts in one month are carried forward to later months.
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sequences in that it might result, for example, in default on install-
ment purchase contracts. Certainly it is unreasonable to expect
budgeting of the earlier income for future needs at the low in-
come levels with which we are concerned.'3 Moreover, unemploy-
ment insurance is not an adequate solution for declining income.' 4
Unemployment insurance does not cover many classes of em-
ployees, including farm labor and the self-employed. Furthermore,
benefits depend upon prior work history, which might be spotty
for low income employees. 15
The shifting three-month average device does not increase wel-
fare benefits when there is declining income. Its moderating in-
fluence actually operates to the detriment of declining incomes:
high income in the early months of the three-month period will
increase the average monthly income, thereby decreasing benefits.
II. RTROSPEarivE DETERMINATION OF INCOME
The proposed solution of Professors Asimow and Klein includes
the retrospective determination of income. The purpose here is
to avoid a reconciliation of welfare payments with actual income
at the end of an accounting period.'6 One justification for avoid-
ing reconciliation is that a needy family is unlikely to have funds
available at the end of the period when a reconciliation would be
required.' 7 Further, even if the welfare recipient does have the
surplus funds available and even if he must make a refund only
13 Contra, Proposed Solution 25 (discussing unreality of carryover budgeting
assumption).
14 Contra, id. 13.
15 Brief descriptions of unemployment insurance and the amendments made by
the Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373 (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 15, 26, 42 U.S.C.) appear in THE PRErSmENT'S COMMISSION ON
INCOME MAINTENANCE, BACKGROUND PAPERS 178 (1970) and in Notes and Brief
Reports, EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1970, 83 SOCIAL SECURITY BuLL. 29
(1970). In 1966, 16.3 million wage earners and 8.7 million self-employed were not
covered. Id. 178. Of those receiving unemployment compensation in 1961, 16 percent
remained poor after receipt of benefits. THE PRESIDENT'S COrMISSION ON INCOME
MAINTENANCE, BACKGROUND PAPERS 189 (1970). The 1970 amendments are expected
to cover 4.75 million more workers by 1972, 33 SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. 29 (1970),
although the effect on their poverty status will depend on their prior work
experience and the levels of state benefits.
16 See Proposed Solution 5.
17 Cf. id.
1971]
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where his income projection was not made in good faith,1 8 he
would have to deal with a hostile administrator in proving his
state of mind.
I agree that a poor family is not likely to have money available
at the end of an accounting period. The very inability of the poor
to save works, as I have suggested, to defeat the carry forward
system. It is not quite fair, however, to say that retrospective deter-
mination of income avoids the problem of reconciliation. It does
so only by disregarding it. The carry forward is, in effect, a limited
and automatic reconciliation of earlier high income with sub-
sequent low income over a twelve month period. The issue really
becomes how much reconciliation is desirable and whether an
administrator can be trusted to determine whether the recipients
have acted in good faith when they predict their income to be-
come eligible for welfare.
If income is low during an accounting period, the needs gen-
erated during that period should be met regardless of whether
higher income was earned during earlier months. A short account-
ing period of one month, modified by a shifting three-month
average, is not responsive enough to declining income. On the
other hand, if income is higher than expected, the family should
account for overpayments if it is able to do so. I suspect that
a major reason for the retrospective determination of income is
the opportunity it affords to pretend that overpayments do not
exist. Overpayments after all are unpopular with the taxpayers.
One wonders, however, whether retrospectivity will conceal this
problem when the underlying facts are brought out.
The question remains, however, whether administrators will
deal with overpayments in a responsible manner. The issue of a
recipient's bad faith is currently relevant, for example, in federal
financial assistance programs'0 and in Old Age, Survivors, and Dis-
18 See id.
19 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(d) (1971):
Where there is evidence which clearly establishes that a recipient
willfully withheld information about his income or resources, such
income or resources may be considered in determination of need to
reduce the amount of the assistance payment in current or future
periods; ....
This provision regulates OAA, AFDC, AB, APTD, and AABD.
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ability Insurance2° (OASDI). The former programs are admin-
istered by the states and OASDI by the Social Security Admin-
istration of the federal government. I suspect that the federal
government is reasonable in its administration of OASDI, al-
though I lack data to prove it. The prospective withholding system
that I have suggested, however, would minimize the opportunity
for bad faith. Under such a system a welfare claimant would pre-
dict whether his income would be low enough during the follow-
ing year to entitle him to welfare. If his prediction renders him
eligible, he receives welfare and his wages are subject to withhold-
ing at negative income tax rates. If overpayments occur, they
are likely to arise from defects in the withholding system rather
than from bad faith. While an overpayment might still result from
bad faith if the employee does not tell his employer to withhold
at NIT rates or if the employee misrepresents his wages, the pro-
posed solution of Professors Asimow and Klein likewise presents
an opportunity for bad faith: the monthly reporting system, dis-
cussed below, requires the administrator to determine whether
the claimant is accurately reporting his income each month.
When the income is in the form of business profits rather than
wages, problems result from the fact that it cannot be withheld,
but must be predicted. The proposed solution lessens the risk of
inaccurate prediction, however, by using the preceding year's in-
come to determine the income for the year for which welfare is
claimed.21 This considerably lessens the claimant's ability to avoid
the problem of reconciliation. Furthermore, administrators under
the proposed solution might still question the candor of the busi-
ness applicant in reporting the preceding year's income.
III. MONTHLY REPORTING
A third element in the proposed solution of Professors Asimow
and Klein is the monthly reporting requirement.22 Is it desirable
to compel such frequent contact with the bureaucracy? Will an
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1968). See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.506.-507, .510, .510a,
.511 (1971).
21 See note 9 supra.
22 See note 7 supra.
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employee who is paid on a daily basis lose a day's pay or perhaps
his job as a result of taking time to contact the agency? The report
of the recent NIT experiment in New Jersey suggests that the pri-
mary goal was to determine the effect of graduated income main-
tenance payments on work effort.23 It is unclear whether there was
a real evaluation of potential problems relating to administration
-problems created by absence from work, by reluctance to con-
tact the administration, and by unsympathetic exercises of dis-
cretion.24 I suspect that the administrative problems which a
nation-wide NIT would encounter were not dealt with in the
experiment and have not received adequate testing.
A reporting system as short as a month was probably adopted
to make the system responsive to changes in income, since any
period longer than a month would mean unacceptable delay be-
fore the adjustment of payments at the period's end. A with-
holding system based on a prospective estimate of annual income
would, however, be responsive without requiring monthly contact
between administrators and recipients. Under such a system the
full amount of welfare would be paid every month. If an employee
did not have income in a particular month, there would be no
withholding and hence no reduction in the level of benefits.
IV. WITHHOLDING SYSTEM
I am not suggesting that the withholding system is without
difficulty. Several problems deserve consideration. First, employers
might not be able to handle two different sets of withholding
tables. This is especially serious in view of the kinds of employers,
including homeowners with domestic help, likely to employ the
poor. Second, employers might not withhold at all or might re-
fuse to hire those who create such bookkeeping problems. There
has been expansion, however, in the definition of covered em-
ployers in the closely related area of unemployment insurance
to include some employers previously omitted for administrative
23 OFFIcE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE NEW JERSEY
GRADUATED WORK INCENTIVE EXPERIMENT, 1, 26 (1970).
24 See id. 3, 23, 26.
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reasons. 25 Third, a large amount withheld from wages might have
more disincentive effects than an equivalent reduction in welfare
accompanied by higher take home pay.
Nonetheless, a withholding system deserves to be tried since it
minimizes the opportunity for bad faith, allows a quick response
to declining income, permits reconciliation, and limits contact
with the bureaucracy. The proposed solution of Professors Asimow
and Klein on the other hand, responds inadequately (either im-
mediately or through reconciliation to the problem of declining
income), presents the same potential as the withholding system
for administrators to question the good faith of recipients, and
requires too frequent contact with the administration.
25 Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373 (Aug. 10,
1970; effective after Dec. 31, 1971) §101 (a), amending INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 3306(a). Generally speaking, an employer was covered only if he had four
employees on a regular basis during the year. Under the new law, he is covered
if he has one employee on a regular basis or if he pays $1500 wages during a
calendar quarter.
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